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No. 20150996-SC
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
_________________
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent
v.
RYAN MOOERS AND DARRON LAVEN BECKER,
Defendants/Petitioners.
________________
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONERS ON CERTIORARI REVIEW

INTRODUCTION
This reply is “limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing
brief.” Utah R. App. P. 24(c).
ARGUMENT
I.

The Court of Appeals Erred in Concluding It Lacked
Jurisdiction over Petitioners’ Direct Appeal of Their
Restitution Orders.
As explained in Petitioners’ opening brief, under Utah’s statutory scheme, a

restitution order is a separate appealable final order over which Utah’s appellate
courts have jurisdiction, regardless of the court’s jurisdiction to address the
underlying conviction. Pet.Br.12-13. Appellate courts have jurisdiction to address
a restitution order because restitution is “an independent component of the
sentence decreed in the judgment.” State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203, 1207 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992); State v. Allen, 2000 UT App 340, ¶9, 15 P.3d 110 (“Utah law

provides an independent legal basis for restitution.”). This is because “[n]either
subsequent proceedings to determine, nor an order assessing, a specific amount
of restitution directly affects” the underlying plea in abeyance agreement. Sanoff
v. People, 187 P.3d 576, 578 (Colo. 2008) (en banc) (deciding “an order for a
specific amount of restitution” is a separate, final appealable order); see State v.
Garner, 2005 UT 6, ¶17, 106 P.3d 729 (holding that a non-material modification
of a restitution amount is not a “new and final judgment for purposes of
appealing the underlying merits of a criminal conviction” (emphasis added));
State v. Abbot, 2000 UT App 342U, *1 (unpublished) (per curiam) (noting that
timely appeal from restitution order does not constitute timely appeal from
underlying judgment of conviction and sentence).
Petitioners cite Utah’s case law and statutory scheme to support their
argument that restitution orders are final appealable orders in the plea in
abeyance context—independent of the final judgment of conviction. See
Pet.Br.Pt.I. The State concedes that a defendant has the right to separately appeal
a restitution order but attempts to limit this right to a particular “type” of
defendant. See Resp.Br.22-26. It argues that only a “convicted” defendant has the
right to directly appeal a restitution order because “[o]therwise,” the time the
court is permitted to assess the restitution amount would cause the defendant’s
appeal to be delayed “forc[ing him] to wait . . . before seeking review of [his]
conviction.” Res.Br.24 (asserting it “‘makes sense’ to permit a convicted
defendant to immediately proceed to direct appeal” because the delay in
2

determining the restitution amount may be “up to one year after sentencing”—
beyond the jurisdictional time limit for filing an appeal). The State contends
these concerns do “not apply in the plea in abeyance context . . . because a
recipient . . . has not been convicted, [so] there is no conviction for him to
appeal.” Id. at 25.
But, as argued in Petitioners opening brief, “the rationale behind exercising
independent jurisdiction over criminal convictions and criminal restitution is
every bit as strong when the plea is held in abeyance until successful payment of
restitution” where a defendant also faces significant delays and errors in the
award of restitution amounts while being threatened with criminal sanctions
including incarceration if he fails to pay but is unable to seek direct review.
Pet.Br.13-15; see also Garner, 2005 UT 6, ¶¶15-16 (distinguishing the separate
appellate timeline for criminal restitution and criminal conviction so as not to
“significantly delay[]” “a defendant’s right to appeal in criminal cases”).
The State argues the imposition of the specific amount of restitution does
not differ from “any other condition [imposed in the] plea in abeyance
agreement,” therefore it does not “defy logic” to deny a defendant the right to
directly appeal until after the conviction and sentence are imposed. Res.Br.25-26.
The State’s argument ignores the distinction between those “other conditions”
which are set forth when the plea in abeyance agreement is entered and the later
determination of a specific amount of restitution which can and often does
remain unknown long after entry. Res.Br.25-26; Utah Code §77-38a-302(2)(b)
3

(2013) (prior statute gave the court one year from sentencing to make restitution
determination); Utah Code §77-38a-302(2)(b) (Supp.2016) (statute amended to
eliminate the one-year jurisdictional deadline). Unlike the “other conditions”
imposed as part of a plea in abeyance which are known and subject to challenge,
an erroneously awarded restitution amount could never be challenged until a
violation occurs.
For example, the State cites “paying child support” as an example of
“possible common conditions of a plea in abeyance” agreement that could
“require the defendant to pay substantial monthly sums” but would not be
subject to a direct appeal. Res.Br.26n.6. But this is not true. The plea in abeyance
statute allows the district court to “order that the defendant comply with any
other condition which could have been imposed as conditions of probation upon
conviction and sentencing for the same offense.” Utah Code §77-2a-3(5)(d). One
of the conditions under the probation statute “the court may require” is that the
defendant “provide for the support of others for whose support the defendant is
legally liable.” Utah Code §77-18-1(8)(a)(iii); see also Utah Code §78B-12-101
(Utah Child Support Act), -205 (listing rebuttable support guidelines court must
establish when calculating each parents’ obligation); -202 (listing relevant factors
court must consider to establish child support when sufficient evidence exists to
rebut the child support guidelines in subsection -205).
For the payment of child support to be imposed as a condition of probation
or a term of a plea, the condition must either be based on an existing child
4

support order or a separate order imposed in compliance with the Utah Child
Support Act’s statutory requirements. See Utah Code §78B-12-202(4) (“When no
prior court order exists, the court shall determine and assess all arrearages based
upon the guidelines described in this chapter.”). Child support orders imposed in
accordance with these required guidelines or factors are final orders that can be
directly appealed within the jurisdictional timeframe established by rule. See
Utah R. App. P. 4(a); Utah Code §78B-12-110 (stating “[a]ppeals may be taken
from orders and judgments under this chapter as in other civil actions”). Thus, a
defendant has notice of the amount of child support owing before the plea in
abeyance is entered and does not face the possibility of an unknown “substantial
monthly sum” being imposed as a condition while being denied the right to
directly appeal the order initially establishing this financial obligation.
In contrast, under the State’s theory, the restitution amount awarded in a
plea in abeyance context would not be subject to challenge when it is imposed.
According to the State, the court can assign the obligation to pay restitution as a
condition when the plea in abeyance is entered without giving the defendant
notice of the specific amount of restitution that he will be responsible for paying
until some later date. The defendant would be responsible to pay this unknown
amount of restitution or face criminal sanctions or incarceration while having no
right to directly appeal an erroneous award amount or withdraw his plea. See
Utah Code §77-13-6(2)(b) (defendant has 30-day jurisdictional time limit to move
to withdraw a plea held in abeyance). It would also render the defendant’s right
5

under the statute to dispute the amount of restitution imposed meaningless. See
State v. Toole County, 2002 UT 8, ¶10, 44 P.3d 680 (When interpreting statutes,
the Court “seek[s] ‘to render all part [of the statute] relevant and meaningful,’
and . . .‘avoid interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or
inoperative’”).
Contrary to the State’s argument, restitution imposed as part of a plea in
abeyance is necessarily a separate appealable final order for these agreements to
comply with constitutional and state law requirements that a defendant facing
punishment have “a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its
consequences.” State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987); see also U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, §1 (ensuring due process); Utah Const. art. I, §7 (same); State
v. Beckstead, 2006 UT 42, ¶10, 140 P.3d 1288 (recognizing that the trial court
must ensure that the defendant understands the rights he is giving up and that he
has voluntarily waived known rights); State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, ¶ 11, 22 P.3d
1242 (stating that the trial court must ensure that “defendants know of their
rights and thereby understand the basic consequences of their decision to plead
guilty”); State v. Gibson, 2009 UT App 108, ¶15, 208 P.3d 543 (acknowledging
“defendant has all the due process rights inherent in [a restitution] hearing and
also has the right to appeal the resulting determination”).
Under Utah law, restitution is a direct consequence of a plea to which
defendant must be sufficiently informed. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 2007 UT App
332, ¶19, 170 P.3d 1141 (recognizing that restitution serves many purposes
6

including rehabilitation and deterrence); State v. Cabrera, 2007 UT App 194, ¶8,
163 P.3d 707 (recognizing that restitution serves as criminal punishment and
rehabilitation); see also Utah Code §§77-2a-2(4) (stating plea in abeyance
agreement shall include full detailed recitation of requirements and conditions);
77-38a-102(7) (specifying plea agreement must “set[] forth the special terms and
conditions . . . upon which the defendant will enter a plea of guilty”); -102(9)
(specifying plea in abeyance to contain the “specific conditions” which the
defendant must comply); -102(10) (defining “plea in abeyance agreement” as “an
agreement . . . setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon which,
following acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in
abeyance”); Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(6).
Adequate notice of the amount of restitution that a defendant will be
obligated to pay is a critical requirement a defendant must have before entering
into a plea in abeyance. The importance of this requirement is reflected in the
plea in abeyance statute itself which mandates that acceptance of an agreement
“be done in full compliance with the provisions of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.” Utah Code §77-2a-3(1)(a). Rule 11 requires that if the plea “is a result
of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement” the court must determine “what
agreement has been reached.” Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(6). At the time of
disposition the agreement must be clear, meaning significant terms and
conditions are explicit and unambiguous. See United States v. Burns, 160 F.3d
82, 83 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating “significant plea-agreement terms should be stated
7

explicitly and unambiguously so as to preclude their subsequent circumvention
by either party”); State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, ¶19, 69 P.3d 838 (stating
“‘[a]ny omissions or ambiguities in the affidavit must be clarified during the plea
hearing, as must any uncertainties raised in the course of the plea colloquy’”)
(cite omitted).
The importance of a defendant receiving sufficient notice of the restitution
amount is also expressly reflected in the plain language of the restitution statute.
According to the statute, parties in a criminal case may enter into a plea
agreement when restitution is in dispute, and the trial court may resolve
restitution issues at a separate hearing after the plea. See Utah Code §§77-38a203(2)(c); 77-38a-302(4). Also, the statute requires the prosecutor at the time of
the plea to reveal the amount in actual or estimated restitution that the State has
calculated against the defendant using the criteria set forth in the statute. Utah
Code §77-38a-202(1)-(2).
Subsection (1) states, “At the time of entry of . . . any plea disposition of a
felony or a class A misdemeanor,” the prosecutor shall divulge “the actual or
estimated amount of restitution specified as part of the plea disposition.” Utah
Code §77-38a-202(1)(b), -202(2) (in computing actual or estimated restitution,
the prosecutor shall use criteria set forth in section 77-38a-302); see also §7738a-201 (requiring law enforcement to assess claims of restitution when
investigating criminal conduct); §77-38a-102(8) (defining plea disposition). In
addition, the prosecutor must disclose “whether or not the defendant has agreed
8

to pay the restitution specified as part of the plea disposition.” Id. at §77-38a202(1)(c); see also State v. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, ¶9, 60 P.3d 582
(recognizing “a defendant cannot be ordered to pay restitution for criminal
activities for which the defendant did not admit responsibility, was not convicted,
or did not agree to pay restitution”).
Thereafter, if the defendant “objects to the imposition, amount, or
distribution of the restitution, the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing
on the issue.” Utah Code§77-38a-302(4), see also §77-38a-203(2)(c). This
evidentiary hearing will likely be held at a later date where the court will consider
factors relevant to the victim and to defendant’s financial resources and ability to
pay. Utah Code §77-38a-302(5). To avoid rendering a defendant’s right to
challenge an erroneous restitution amount meaningless, this provision must be
interpreted as further support that restitution orders are necessarily separate
appealable final orders, independent of the underlying plea in abeyance
agreement. See Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, ¶17, 5 P.3d 616 (“The plain language
of a statute is to be read as a whole, and its provisions interpreted in harmony
with other provisions in the same statute.”).
Reading the applicable statutes as a whole supports Petitioners’ argument
that “Utah law provides an independent legal basis for restitution,” independent
of the underlying plea in abeyance agreement, giving a defendant the right to
directly appeal such orders. Allen, 2000 UT App 340, ¶9; State v. Turnbow,
2001 UT App 59, ¶13n.4, 21 P.3d 249 (noting in plea in abeyance case “that there
9

is statutory authority to enforce a restitution order separately from probation
orders.” (citation omitted)); see also Utah Code §§77-2a-3(5)(d) (allowing court
to order a defendant to comply with “any other conditions which could have been
imposed as conditions of probation”), -(4) (permitting court to “require the
Department of Corrections to assist in the administration of the plea in abeyance
agreement as if the defendant were on probation to the court under Section 7718-1”); §§77-18-1(1) (incorporating plea in abeyance agreements), -8(ix)
(condition of probation may include the defendant to “make restitution . . . in
accordance with” the restitution statute).
The plea in abeyance statute requires that “an order that the defendant pay
restitution to the victims of the defendant’s actions [be determined] as provided”
in the Crime Victims Restitution Act. Utah Code §§77-2a-3(5)(b). Similarly, the
restitution statute expressly requires that restitution imposed pursuant to a plea
in abeyance be decided under its mandated criteria. See Utah Code §77-38a102(1)(b) & (c) (defining “conviction” to include “a plea of guilty” and “a plea of
no contest”); -102(9) (defining a plea in abeyance in part as “an order by a court .
. . accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest”). For the purposes of restitution,
pleas in abeyance fall under the definition of “conviction” as that term is used in
the statute. Id. The restitution statute provides that “[w]hen a defendant is
convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition
to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant
make restitution . . . .” Utah Code §77-38a-302(1). Thus, in accordance with the
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statute’s plain language, restitution imposed under a plea in abeyance is “an
independent component of the sentence decreed in the judgment” and is a
separately appealable final order over which Utah’s appellate courts have
jurisdiction. Dickey, 841 P.2d at 1207.
The Colorado Supreme Court’s explanation of the difference between the
finality of “a subsequent determination of the amount of restitution owed by a
defendant, as distinguished from an order simply finding [the defendant] liable
to pay restitution” is instructive. Sanoff, 187 P.3d at 578. Like Utah, Colorado
law views restitution as “a component of a defendant’s sentence” and requires the
sentencing court to determine restitution. People v. Hill, 296 P.3d 121, 123 (Colo.
App. 2011); compare Utah Code §77-38a-302. Under prior law, Colorado’s
sentencing court was required “to impose a restitution obligation on the
defendant and to include the amount of restitution . . . .” People v. Johnson, 780
P.2d 504, 506 (Colo. 1989) (en banc). For the purposes of finality, when the court
imposed the specific amount of restitution owed it became part of the sentence
and judgment of conviction and appealable. Id. at 508 (requiring under
Colorado’s former statutory scheme that court “set the amount of restitution at
the time of sentencing”).
In 2000, Colorado’s legislature “altered the prior [restitution] scheme by
relieving the sentencing court of the obligation to set the amount of restitution at
the time of imposing sentence . . . .” Sanoff, 187 P.3d at 578 (emphasis added).
“While the statute continues to require that every order of conviction include
11

consideration of restitution, it now expressly permits the sentencing court to
merely order that the defendant be obligated to pay restitution and postpone a
determination of the specific amount of restitution.” Id. (emphasis added)
(change in statutory requirement “clearly distinguishes an order assigning
liability for restitution from a determination of the amount of restitution for
which the defendant is liable.”).
Eliminating the requirement means “that the amount of the defendant’s
liability no longer [is a] required component of a final judgment of conviction.”
Id. “[A] subsequent determination of the amount of restitution owed by a
defendant, as distinguished from an order simply finding her liable to pay
restitution, has been severed from the meaning of the term ‘sentence’ as
contemplated by [the criminal rules of procedure] and therefore from [the]
judgment of conviction.” Id. Thus, when the court imposes an order for a specific
amount of restitution it is “a separate, final judgment . . . [and] is itself an
appealable order.” Id. (trial court is “not divested of jurisdiction to proceed to set
an amount of restitution by an ongoing appeal of the defendant’s conviction”);
Hill, 296 P.3d at 123 (“Because restitution is a component of a defendant’s
sentence, the defendant may directly appeal a restitution order.”); People v.
Henson, 307 P.3d 1135 (Colo. App. 2013) (defendant separately appealed order of
restitution amount imposed as part of a deferred judgment); People v. Leonard,
167 P.3d 178 (Colo. App. 2007) (unpublished) (same); State v. V.O., 193 Wash.
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